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The economic inefficiencies of market
liberalization
The case of financial information in the London Stock
Exchange
■ Aeron Davis
Goldsmiths College, University of London
A B S T R A C T
This article returns to the long-running public service versus free market debate in
media and communications but from a rather unconventional perspective. Critics
of the steady, globally driven marketization of national public media and infor-
mation services tend to object on social and political grounds. Market advocates,
in contrast, make their case on economic grounds. Greater competition in
markets, including media markets, brings economic efficiencies which, in turn,
are a ‘public good’. This economic assertion is rarely scrutinized within media
studies. The study presented here, which looks at financial media and communi-
cations in the London Stock Exchange (LSE), does just this. In recent decades the
LSE has been opened up to accommodate the needs of international financial
institutions and international capital flows. This has had a detrimental impact on
its media and information systems. Such liberalization, it is argued, has made the
LSE less economically efficient, not more, and with quite negative economic (as
well as social) consequences.
K E Y  W O R D S
economic efficiency ■ financial information ■ free market media ■ stock
markets
Media, information and the public good1
This article restates the case for greater financial support for, and
regulation of, public service media and communication systems. How-
ever, it does so on grounds rather different from the norm. Instead of
focusing on the social and political consequences of marketization, the
usual starting point for critiques of neo-liberal economic policy, the
emphasis here is on economic consequences. Rather than looking
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backwards, at a ‘golden age’ of public service media, this piece looks
forward at a communication system that has been subjected to a period
of intense, globally driven market liberalization. In place of social crises
and democratic deficits, it is economic crises which are observed. Instead
of nation states and citizens, it is markets and market participants that
provide the case study material.
Objectors to the ascendancy of neo-liberal, public policy making
and the rise of transnational media conglomerates have made their
criticisms largely on social and political grounds. Such policies, they
argue, have contributed to social inequality at all levels and a weakening
of democratic systems. Economic progress is often achieved to the
detriment of the greater ‘public good’ at the local, national and global
levels. In respect to communications, media is regarded as a ‘public
resource’ that offers many services vital to the sustenance of democratic
systems and the global public sphere. Media help citizens to make
informed social and political choices, hold the powerful to account,
reflect pluralist public opinion, and provide a public sphere for objective
and rational debate (see Keane, 1991; Curran, 2002 for overviews).
However, the steady marketization of public media and information
systems means that information is being increasingly guided by market
needs rather than public ideals. A ‘refeudalized’ (global) public sphere
and a crisis of public confidence and political participation are the
consequences (Habermas, 1989; Deacon and Golding, 1994; Blumler and
Gurevitch, 1995; Herman and Chomsky, 2002).2
Market advocates have responded with two lines of reasoning. One
is to contest the social and political assumptions about what best
advances the ‘public good’. Politically autonomous communication
industries with greater diversity, audience choice and access are regarded
as social and political advances and, therefore, also a ‘public good’.3
Thus, the ‘golden age’ thesis of an earlier, ‘better’, public service media,
public sphere and social system is questionable.
Secondly, neo-liberals have argued that the ‘economic good’, advan-
ced by free market policies, can in itself be a greater contributor to the
‘public good’. This emphasis on the market, as the means to harmonize
individual self-interests with the greater social and economic good, has
an intellectual history dating back to Adam Smith. In its contemporary
form, free market advocates argue that liberalization brings economic
advancements, measurable in terms of greater efficiency, productivity,
competitiveness, investment and innovation. Such economic develop-
ments, in turn, bring about positive, measurable, social consequences as
a natural by-product. These include greater employment, lower prices
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and more consumer choice (see, for example, Brittan, 1983; Littlechild,
2000). The same arguments have been applied to Britain’s communi-
cation industries (Peacock, 1986; Veljanovski, 1989; Beesley, 1996) and
driven negotiations at successive international trade talks (Freedman,
2005). Whatever the debates, it appears that free market advocates, and
economic arguments, appear to be driving the long-term communi-
cations policy agenda in Britain, as in most OECD countries. Those
industries which have not been fully privatized have still been restruc-
tured and funded according to market thinking (see Curran and Seaton,
1997; Leys, 2001, for overviews of the UK case). With a few notable
exceptions, what is rarely questioned or tested in media studies is this
presumption of economic advancement made by the free market lobby.
This study, centred on the production and dissemination of
financial media and information in the equities (company shares)
market of the London Stock Exchange (LSE or ‘City’), does just this. The
LSE, in terms of assets managed and people employed (over 300,000) is
the third largest stock market in the world. On the one hand, being
increasingly dominated by international ‘institutional investors’ and
banks, it has a significant effect on, and is also affected by, the UK
economy and the global financial system. However, at the same time, it
is also a relatively autonomous socio-economic entity with its own legal
and economic rules and, significantly, its own media and information
systems. In recent decades the City has been subjected to intensive
competition and deregulation. In many ways, these liberalization
policies have had a debilitating impact on these internally produced and
consumed information systems. This, in turn, has had a negative impact
on the economic strength of the LSE itself. In effect, greater marke-
tization has not necessarily brought greater economic efficiency and
advancement.
For two extended periods, in 1998–99 and 2004, research investigated
aspects of media and communications used in the trading of company
shares in the LSE. The studies included some 95 semi-structured
interviews at over 80 different City locations.4 Each specific set of inter-
viewees (communications staff, fund managers and journalists) was
‘theoretically sampled’ from professional/industry publications. Each set
were asked for responses to the same list of semi-structured and open
questions. The citations used here are representative of the majority or
most common responses. In addition, several government, regulatory
and industry reports and data-sets were collected and compared with the
interview findings.
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The social information market meets the free information market
in the London Stock Exchange
Financial markets, like nation states, are social systems which seek to
balance the needs of individuals with those of the general public good.
Thus, markets must consider the needs of individual market participants
(citizens) next to those of the market itself (society) and, in the process,
establish ideals and principles that best achieve a balance. The freedom
of participants, as profit-maximizing individuals, must not outweigh
the needs of a cohesive market, dependent on elements of consensus
and cooperation in order to function. Like national social systems,
information is a central element of this tension. The production and
dissemination of accurate market data exercises the thoughts of
participants and authorities more than any other issue. On the one
hand, it is assumed that markets work most efficiently (are ‘frictionless’)
when prices reflect all available information. For that to happen all
price-sensitive information should be as cheaply, accurately and widely
distributed as possible.5 This should maintain confidence and attract
more participants to a market. On the other hand, individuals will also
only participate if they believe they can gain information that will give
them a trading advantage over others. Thus, like states, financial market
regulators are faced with a similar free-market/public service dilemma in
regards to the regulation of information. Financial information is a
public resource that must be freely available and widely disseminated,
yet participants continue to seek exclusive, private, alternative (or
commodified) sources of information to gain a trading edge.
Legislation and regulation of the City under the Thatcher Govern-
ment (1979–89), particularly those measures put into force in 1985–6
(‘Big Bang’), were strongly determined by the principles of financial
market theory. One part of this involved introducing greater com-
petition into the City to lower trading costs and attract more investors.
In terms of competition, the once ‘closed shop’ of the City was forcibly
opened up. Stock Exchange monopoly trading conditions were broken,
competition increased and transaction costs decreased. At the same
time, legislation also demanded better regulation and greater availability
of the ‘price-sensitive’ information produced by quoted companies. By
2000, the 2488 pages of regulations that had been produced worked to
reduce insider trading, increased investor confidence and drew more
investors (see Marston, 1996; Kynaston, 2001; Chapman, 2002, for
general accounts).
For many observers these changes brought great economic success.
The combination of regulated information supply and market
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deregulation led to significant growth in the LSE in terms of market
infrastructure, trading activity, capital investment and employment.
International financial services grew at an average of 7 per cent per year.
By 2000 the City had an annual surplus in overseas trade of £31.1 billion
(Golding, 2003: 11). The intense marketization of the LSE helped the City
to successfully maintain its position as Europe’s leading financial centre.
However, in the longer term, such intense marketization has also
had a detrimental impact on the production and dissemination of
financial information in the LSE itself. This is primarily because
information regulation focused exclusively on the information produced
and disseminated by companies about themselves. In a national media
system, this would be akin to putting the onus on governments and
others to honestly disseminate information about themselves through a
passive, central media system and then to deregulate all other media
entirely. It misses the points that: (a) companies (and governments) are
only one source of information about themselves; (b) such information
is unlikely to be neutral; and (c) alternative media producers then
operate in a completely unregulated environment. Most of this non-
company generated information is not really treated as a competitively
produced commodity in itself: i.e., in terms of its independence, quality,
cost or efficiency of production.
In terms of the equities market of the LSE, the main occupation of
many companies, indeed, involves the generation of large quantities of
price-sensitive information in order to inform trading decisions.
Financial news media/information suppliers, research analysts and fund
management companies all generate and exchange large quantities of
price-sensitive information (see Figure 1). A whole set of smaller infor-
mation service providers also exist, including legal and accounting firms,
financial public relations and investor relations companies and invest-
ment consultants. What became apparent through both research periods
was that increased competition, in all these parts of the LSE, has,
accordingly, affected their production of financial information. Obvious
trading costs have been reduced but, in the process, price-sensitive
information, the lifeblood of the LSE, has become commodified to an
extreme level.
At each stage of the research a similar set of developments and
consequences was apparent. Increased sector competition had led to
attempts to cut the costs of information production and/or hide those
costs from those further down the investment chain. This led to greater
dependency on ‘information subsidies’ (Gandy, 1982) being supplied by
market intermediaries which, accordingly, have grown in number. Since
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these intermediaries tended to generate very similar information, based
on the same material supplied by traded company sources, information
over-production was one result. Lack of competition and diversity,
amongst these information intermediaries, was another. At the same
time, this widespread dependency on ‘information subsidies’, supplied
by the very companies being ‘independently’ evaluated, meant that
much information was unlikely to be impartial. Investors, at the end of
the information chain, were then left to take their chances with such
information or, alternatively, use investment strategies that excluded the
necessity for such information altogether. In all cases the trading
practices and patterns that resulted did not appear to operate efficiently.
In effect, unfettered free market policies, applied to the institutions and
financial information providers of the London Stock Market, have had a
detrimental effect on the market’s operations. Liberalizing the LSE has
corrupted its information systems which, in turn, has made trading
operate less efficiently.
The market corruption of information in the London Stock
Market
The research looked at the three main producers and disseminators of
financial information about traded companies (excluding the companies
themselves) within the equities market of the LSE (see Figure 1). Accor-
ding to interviews with professional investors (see also MORI, 2000)
these are: (i) financial media/news wire services; (ii) brokers’ (or ‘sell-
side’) analyst research; and (iii) fund manager (or ‘buy-side’) research.
1 6 2 Global Media and Communication 3(2)
Companies Public RelationsInvestor Relations
Fund Managers 3
Finance Advisors
Retail/Private
Investors
Brokers &
Analysts 2
Financial News Media 1
Investment
Consultants
Institutions:
Banks, Pension
& Insurance
Companies
Figure 1 The financial information chain of the London Stock Exchange
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Financial journalism
One obvious source of financial information in the LSE is the financial
media, including news wire services. It is the most common information
source for amateur (retail) investors and closely watched by fund
managers (Davis, 2005). In financial journalism, expansion, combined
with greater media and financial competition, has forced journalists to
produce more copy with fewer resources. This has increased journalist
dependency on a range of ‘information subsidy’ suppliers, including
quoted companies, financial public and investor relations professionals,
and brokers’ analysts. Since all these sources are, in the main, using
information produced by quoted companies themselves, news content is
rather less diverse and independent than appears to traders.
The post-war rise in financial/business journalism (television and
newspaper) has been noted in many studies (Parsons, 1989; Tumber,
1993; Tunstall, 1996; Cassidy, 2002). Such journalism now makes up
approximately one third of serious news space. However, during the
1980s and 1990s, just as competition reached new levels in the financial
sector so it did in the news media industries (Seymour-Ure, 1996;
Tunstall, 1996; Franklin, 1997). Financial journalism, like journalism
generally, was continually forced to increase output while making cuts
in staffing and other resource levels. This made financial news
particularly reliant on the information supplied by corporate advertising
and public relations to support its expansion (Curran, 1978; Newman,
1984; Davis, 2002). As interviews revealed, there are too few specialist
journalists, covering extensive ‘beats’ that require complex knowledge of
financial accounting and City practices. Even for the most experienced
reporters, there do not exist the resources to check the financial details
produced in company documents. As one explained:
There are a large number of people with interests a mile wide and with
knowledge an inch deep. Newspapers just don’t have the specialists.
Standards per se have not got worse. If a single journalist has to cover
banking, aviation, etc., then your level of knowledge gets worse because
there is just too much. (Paul Barber, 20 August 1998)
For another: 
Even experienced journalists who have been covering the financial services
sector for years are not experts and some have admitted to me that they
don’t really understand the field. (Nick Chaloner, 16 September 1998)
The resource gap, since the 1980s, has instead been filled by companies
employing financial public relations specialists. To many observers,
public relations and advertising have indeed had a greater influence on
Davis The economic inefficiencies of market liberalization 1 6 3
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financial media than any other sector of the national news media
(Parsons, 1989; Cassidy, 2002; Davis, 2002; Golding, 2003). This was the
assessment of two former financial journalists now working in financial
PR:
Undoubtedly there is more PR in financial news than other sections. (Roland
Rudd, 15 October 1998)
I would say it [financial news] was 85 or even 90 per cent driven by formal
announcements or events . . . The majority of journalists wouldn’t even go
down to Companies House to look up the annual reports and accounts.
(Martin Adeney, 17 December 1998)
During the 1990s, the investor relations (IR) industry developed and
expanded to become a third source of information subsidies for financial
journalists. They began promoting companies directly to large invest-
ment institutions and did so, in large part, by supplying information to
brokers’ analysts and journalists. According to several accounts
(Marston, 1996, 1999; Holland, 1997), the IR function increased the
levels of ‘controlled information disclosure’ between companies and
analysts. By the end of the 1990s, 77 per cent of analysts had at least
weekly contact with their investor relations counterparts (Investor
Relations Society, 1998: 33). Since journalists regard analysts as the
independent ‘experts’ on companies, and regularly use their comments,
this has become yet another form of company-supplied information
subsidy for financial journalism.
Fund managers, interviewed some years later, were clearly sceptical
about the content of financial news and its reliance on company, public
relations and investor relations information. It seemed common
knowledge that many company intermediaries attempted to ‘manage
expectations’ and share prices by regularly leaking information to
journalists, directly or through third parties:
Most of the financial media get their ideas from the analysts they talk to,
their mates in the City tell them what’s going on and what’s likely to go on.
They are basically trying to sell things and then the journalists pick up on
the trends – by and large. (Tony Dye, 7 April 2004)
But a lot are just fed by the financial PR machine and that’s all they do; they
regurgitate the financial PR, which ain’t much good. There are journalists
who are conscientious and experienced, but there aren’t many these days.
(Anonymous fund manager, 2004)
During both research periods, it became apparent that financial
news coverage had become overly influenced by the very companies
journalists reported on. Quite apart from the overt pressures companies
1 6 4 Global Media and Communication 3(2)
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could exert – in terms of advertising clout and controlled access –
journalism was extremely dependent on a variety of information
subsidies provided by companies and their promotional intermediaries.
In cutting costs, financial journalism had become more dependent on,
and encouraged the growth of, several unregulated sources of financial
information production. That information was over-produced, unreliable
and lacking in diversity.
Brokers’ analyst research
The most central and prolific set of information producers in the LSE are
the research (also known as ‘sell-side’) analysts working for the broking
houses. An estimated 14,000 people employed in broking houses (City
Business Series, 2003), produce and disseminate 52 per cent of all
financial research on companies (FSA/Deloitte and Touche, April 2004).
Increased marketization in the 1980s caused a number of problems in
this research process too.
Prior to the 1986 Financial Services Act, a small number of London-
based brokers controlled access to the market by managing all trading
activity and at high, fixed rates of commission. The high rates effectively
paid for analysis, and investors therefore selected brokers on research
ability and tip quality rather than on cost. After 1986 fixed commission
rates were abandoned and any outside company could act as broker and
‘market maker’. This had the obvious benefit of reducing trading costs
and encouraging more trading. However, it also meant that brokers were
encouraged to cut research costs to compete for business in an inter-
national, intensely competitive market. As one ex-broker explained:
And this is why a lot of the brokers then [post-Big Bang] went into market
making because they knew their stand alone business on 0.25% wouldn’t
survive really . . . The research departments got too big and became very
expensive . . . so they had to cull some. (Mike Cunnane, 8 October 2004)
Fewer research resources thus meant a greater reliance on company
information subsidies, either directly or indirectly, via investor relations
practitioners (see above).
Equally significantly, broking houses became legally open to
takeover and were almost all bought up by wealthier international
investment banks. Investment banks have multiple forms of income, the
largest of which involves offering financial services to publicly quoted
companies. Since these are the same companies that brokers’ analysts are
researching and promoting, obvious conflicts of interest arose (see
Davis The economic inefficiencies of market liberalization 1 6 5
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Kynaston, 2001; Chapman, 2002; Golding, 2003, for accounts). As Tony
Golding explained:
In the 1970s, pre-Big-Bang, the advice of analysts was listened to and there
was a natural mechanism and they were paid more for having good
judgement. After Big Bang, when investment banks bought up brokers and
the profitability of broking went way down, it became quite clear that you
couldn’t justify analysts just being analysts. You had to use them to open
doors to other kinds of corporate business. So the whole thing became
distorted. (Tony Golding, 6 April 2004)
The conflicted and unreliable nature of broker research was clear to
many on the fund management side:
Everyone puts their brokers’ circulars or sell-side notes out . . . To the
corporations they are saying ‘we know all about your industry and we would
be very good to advise you on all your financial business’. To the fund
managers they are saying ‘we know all about these companies and we can
advise you on investments in them’. The great incentive for the investment
bank is to push itself all the time. (Gordon Midgley, 12 March 2004)
Brokers at the various houses will have their own agenda which has been
set for the day – because these are information dissemination, selling
operations. That is what they are – it’s like double glazing salesmen. (Michael
Rimmer, 5 May 2004)
The degree to which analyst information has been corrupted became
apparent in research on analyst recommendations during the 1990s stock
market boom period. During this time brokers became increasingly
reluctant to make ‘sell’ recommendations for fear of offending the com-
panies they analysed. By 2000, according to FSA research (FSA, July 2002:
12) ‘buy’ recommendations in 2000 outnumbered ‘sell’ by a ratio of nine
to one. If a broker’s parent investment banking company was found to
directly advise the company traded, the ratio was 40 to one (FSA, July 2002:
18, see also Chan et al., 2003). Even through the period 2000–02, when
share prices fell heavily, the ratio remained at five ‘buys’ to one ‘sell’.
Following the post-2000 crash in the equities market, the FSA and
Treasury began devoting greater attention to the problem in a series of
discussion papers and policy statements (FSA, July 2002; FSA, February
2003; FSA, October 2003; FSA, March 2004). These papers revealed, in
the words of Howard Davies, then Chairman of the FSA (press release, 12
February 2003) ‘. . . evidence of systematic bias in analysts recom-
mendations, and of bad management of conflicts of interest’. The
picture built up was one in which analysts had become subsidized,
rewarded, pressurized and threatened by companies, in much the same
way journalists are by powerful news sources.
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Thus, as with financial journalism, market competition has had a
negative impact on information production in the broker sector. There is
a general over-supply of information by too many analysts. That infor-
mation is increasingly dependent on companies and their intermediaries
and is, thus, lacking diversity or objectivity. Analysts are not rewarded
for the quality of their information but, instead, through promoting
other financial services and/or pleasing clients regardless of conflicts of
interest.
Fund manager research
The third major source of financial information production is fund
management (or ‘buy-side’) analysis. Fund management companies
produce an estimated 45 per cent of company research (FSA/Deloitte and
Touche, April 2004), as well as making most of the major trading
decisions. Once again, increased market competition has impacted on
the information production process at this level. Deregulation of the
financial markets led to a rapid influx of international financial
institutions and intense competition. The London Stock Exchange is
now the most concentrated, and has the largest overseas investment
presence, of any of the major international exchanges (see Kynaston,
2001; Golding, 2003). On the one hand, fund managers seek to digest as
much price-sensitive information as they can to make better trading
decisions to attract big investors. On the other, resources are limited and
have to be justified when trying to offer a competitive commission rate.
According to one senior financial actuary, increased competition has
indeed resulted in a reduction in fund manager research:
All the competition on percentage of funds does the wrong thing as well. It
may drive the fees down as a percentage of funds under management, but,
what that does, if you then look at the mechanics of your business, is it
forces you to cut your research staff and cut your overheads, which is the
lifeblood of the information that’s valuable to the client. So . . . They are
competing over funds under management charge instead of competing over
a more matched fee for research. (Jeremy Goford, 29 September 2004)
Consequently, fund managers have, in one way or another, attempted to
economize on their information gathering costs and/or hide those costs
from their investing clients. The most obvious way that is done is
through greater reliance on brokers’ analyst research. For many, brokers
simply did the essential ‘donkey work’ and they then did the serious
evaluation:
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No buy-side institution could ever afford to pay for that kind of quality of
[broker] analyst . . . typically, sell-side can be much more concentrated
because there are more of them than buy-side, who, are covering several
sectors. (John Davies, 13 May 2004)
In the ideal world the broker’s role is simply to break bulk . . . I think there is
a legitimate and defensible role that the fund manager should not read all
150 pages of [an annual results statement] and that it’s fair for him to ring
up somebody who has and ask the question ‘What’s the important bit in
here?’ It would be a great waste of everybody’s time if every fund manager
had to read all 150 pages. (Anonymous fund manager, 2004)
However, recent treasury/FSA investigations of the LSE (Myners,
2001; FSA, April 2003; FSA/OXERA, April 2003; FSA/Deloitte and Touche,
April 2004; FSA, May 2004) have found that the information
dependency of fund managers on brokers, generally, is rather more
extensive and costly than that. This research estimated that, in 2000,
£2.3 billion was paid in commission to brokers, of which, approximately
40 per cent went towards research and other information services. These
‘bundled brokerage’ and ‘soft commission’ arrangements, as these
services were labelled, were not formally documented or accounted for.
Thus, there was no means of judging the quality or cost-effectiveness of
that information. At the same time, fund managers were encouraged to
do business with brokers because of their ability to supply free
information subsidies rather than their trading skills.
This also led to information over-supply, as well as a false picture of
information diversity, as every broker competed to supply the same
information to their clients. As one top actuary explained:
I mean the whole soft commission thing . . . arguably encourages over
supply of research. It’s like having 50 TV channels. Is 50 TV channels better
than four or five? Well, yes and no. You’re getting more choice, but you’re
probably getting much lower quality, which is why people flick channels a
lot. There’s a big debate about that. (Andrew Kirton, 22 December 2004)
Alternatively, fund management companies have sought to save on
information/research costs, and so offer lower commission rates to
investors, by doing away with research altogether. A number of
investment approaches simply buy and sell company shares according to
price movements in the market itself. ‘Index tracker’ funds typically buy
and keep FTSE 100 shares and are run automatically by computer
programs. According to estimates by Myners (2001) and Golding (2003),
20–30 per cent of shares are managed in tracker funds or in ‘closet
indexers’. Phillips and Drew (1999, 2000: 5) put this figure higher, at
41–42 per cent. Alternatively, ‘momentum’ investing and hedge funds
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rely on computer analysis of internal market movements and trading
anomalies. Each of these investment approaches, which have increased
significantly since the early 1990s, has considerably reduced research
costs but has not, according to financial market theory, encouraged
efficient trading in the market as a whole.
According to one interviewee, such approaches disconnect trading
prices from real prices, reduce the amount of active buyers in the market
and encourage volatile and ‘herd-like’ trading patterns. As Paul Woolley
explained:
It pays everybody individually to index but, collectively, the market suffers
because there is no efficient pricing. However efficient or inefficient the
market is it’s a zero-sum gain. Second thing is momentum. It pays everyone
to use momentum but momentum causes bubbles and collapses and is
damaging. The third thing is hedge funds. It pays everyone to use them but
collectively it’s extremely damaging . . . we get a bubble like that in 1999 or
2000 which is highly damaging . . . We had half a trillion of fruitless
investment in telecoms infrastructure as a result of that bubble. (Paul
Woolley, 29 April 2004, see also Myners, 2001; Woolley, May 2002,
December 2002)
In attempting to reduce the spiralling costs of information and
research, fund management companies have taken two routes. The first
is to rely on a mix of overt and covert information subsidies, supplied by
brokers’ analysts which are, themselves, subsidized and overly influ-
enced by companies. The second is to do away with research altogether
and manage their investments electronically and purely in relation to
the internal market. Both these options are likely to lead to less
efficiency in trading in the market overall.
Consequences for economic efficiency
The ultimate consequence of liberalizing the LSE’s market structures has
been to liberalize most of its information production also, which, in
turn, has made the LSE a less efficient market. The LSE appears to offer
competitiveness and diversity in information production. However,
much information is repetitive and over-produced, incurs high hidden
costs, and is of poor quality and corrupted.
First, a large proportion of analysis consists of the same information
being repackaged and presented by multiple intermediaries. Public/
investor relations practitioners, journalists and analysts all pick up,
process and pass on the same company-generated information. For fund
managers:
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It’s an industry with over-capacity. On average for a large company there will
be 20–25 analysts per company and that must be an over-supply because
basically their information comes from the same source, which is the
company. (Tony Golding, 6 April 2004)
There’s too much information. So, you could spend your life analysing
things to the end and not coming to a decision. Like 100 Years of Solitude,
that book by Gabriel Marquez. You get to the end and there’s nothing. (Andy
Brough, 28 September 2004)
Of equal significance, a large proportion of the ‘objective’ informa-
tion produced is extremely unreliable. Competition means economizing
on research costs, leading to a reliance on the information subsidies that
are supplied by the very companies and experts that are the subject of
evaluation. Consequently, there is a high level of scepticism amongst
fund managers about the value and objectivity of much financial
information in circulation:
The main thing is we don’t trust anything we get from the company and we
don’t trust anything from sell-side analysts. They offer a tainted product.
They all get money from the companies they comment on . . . The sell-side
are all journalists really. They are no better then journalists using company
information. (Richard Krammer, 26 April 2004)
The only credible source as far as we are concerned is us. That’s the way it
should be for anyone who’s got any sense in the City. There’s incredible
sources and there’s less credible sources but there’s no credible sources at all.
(Tony Dye, 7 April 2004)
Inefficient and corrupt information, in turn, contributes to
inaccurate company valuations and/or a tendency to adopt investment
‘styles’ which do not require company research at all. These have
resulted in pricing for the stock exchange, as a whole, to move away
from historical measures6 and/or become less stable. From the late 1980s
annual returns for investors were impressive but, according to historical
market data, bore little relation to conventional accounting values.
According to Bank of England data (see Figure 2), the LSE’s price–
earnings ratio was 50 per cent higher than its long-term average in the
1990s and by 2000 was two and a half times that average.7 The average
dividend yield (dividends paid to shareholders) was also markedly lower
than its long-term average and had hit a new low in 2000 (see Figure 3).
Both these trends meant that short-term profits were made but, in the
long term, contributed to the LSE being as over-priced as at any point in
the 20th century. Obviously, the corruption of information production
was only one contributing factor to this state of affairs, but, it was a
significant one.
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Ultimately, the costs to the City and those professionally involved in
the LSE have been high. Following the 2000 crash, the market lost
almost 50 per cent of its value over three years. The most severe job
losses in any sector of the UK economy were in the City itself. Despite a
modest recovery since 2003, at the time of writing, it is still below its
peak of 2000 but is still regarded by many as overvalued. Monthly
surveys of fund managers in the industry (Merrill Lynch) indicate it has
been consistently labelled the second most ‘overvalued’ of the markets
after the New York Stock Exchange (see also Smithers and Wright, 2004).
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Figure 3 FTSE All-share dividend yield (1927–2002)
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Since 2000 the LSE’s owners and regulators have been regularly criticized
in business and political circles. In recent years four other international
exchanges have made, or come close to making, take-over bids for the
LSE itself. At the time of writing its future is far from assured.
In effect, the LSE has become less efficient. While direct transaction
costs in the City have gone down, indirect costs have gone up. The
companies and investors at either end of the investment/information
chain, directly or indirectly, have to pay the rising costs of these multi-
ple layers of information intermediaries and their excessive information
outputs. As one independent analyst explained:
At the moment the evidence is . . . there is far more research and effort made
in the management of research than is needed to keep the market efficient.
The City of London and Wall Street make more money than they should.
(Andrew Smithers, 20 April 2004)
Information may be more universally available but its quality, and hence
trading utility, is questionable. It is less diverse or pluralist in nature and
its producers are not rewarded for greater accuracy or attempted
objectivity.
All these concerns were echoed, rather vociferously, by some of the
interviewees:
So maybe the conclusion that you come to is that competition doesn’t work
. . . It’s only because the OFT doesn’t understand that competition does the
wrong thing for customers and they still don’t understand that . . . they just
believe that competition will just solve everything. (Anonymous actuary,
2004)
I think the whole thing is utterly disreputable. Competitive markets are not
efficient markets. The academics have taken us all up the garden path and
the practitioners have enjoyed making money from the whole thing.
(Anonymous fund manager, 2004)
Once you have lost [even] self regulation . . . You get the lunatics running the
asylum quite frankly . . . The UK is wide, wide open and if anyone is going to
bring a tin opener to any part of capitalism it’s going to come in the UK. In
35 years of it I’ve never been so concerned. (David Bailey, 16 August 2004)
Conclusion
Initially, the combination of market deregulation and company
information regulation appeared to have contributed to the overall
health of the London Stock Exchange. The break-up of a privileged and
exclusionary market system encouraged international investment and
maintained the LSE’s position in the global financial system. In financial
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market terms the City began operating more efficiently. However,
extreme marketization has impacted directly on most non-company
generated financial information. Information concerns, such as inde-
pendence and objectivity, quality, cost and efficiency of production,
have not been properly addressed.
This state of affairs has contributed to the LSE becoming, in plain
economic terms, less efficient and cost effective, not more. The costs of
sustaining the market and its many information intermediaries grows.
Investment has become increasingly haphazard as decision-making
comes to rely on ‘promotional’ rather than ‘objective’ information.
Stock market trust, external investment and employment in the equities
market itself has declined. In essence, free market policies, given free
rein in the LSE, have worked to corrupt information. Such developments
have, to an extent, helped put in jeopardy the long-term survival of the
market itself.
The arguments put here have been in terms of the social sphere of
the London Stock Market. But, because the LSE is embedded in both the
British economy and the global financial system, there are also wider
economic (not to mention social and political) consequences. Inefficient
allocation of capital in industries in the UK and elsewhere, costly and
wasteful takeover activity, industrial and employment decline and
displacement, financial instability and unpredictability in national
budgets, large-scale corporate frauds, banking crises and pension fund
collapses are some of the many repercussions noted by observers.8
Interestingly, these problems have also been documented in other
deregulated financial markets, such as the New York Stock Exchange,9 as
well as in the global financial system more generally. None of these
consequences are considered to be ‘public goods’.
The general conclusion is that media and information are key
resources that are essential for the stable functioning of any social sphere
– be it on any scale and in any social, political or economic context. If
they are subjected to unrestrained market forces, left under-resourced
and under-regulated, the stability and longevity of that sphere is
jeopardized. These arguments have usually been put in terms of the
social and political consequences of economic liberalization. These, in
turn, have been contested by those who emphasize that social gains are
a natural by-product of economic stability which, in turn, is aided by
free market policies. However, as argued here, economic stability
becomes just as insecure and unsustainable if simply guided by neo-
liberal economic thinking. The core assumption that free markets are
purely beneficial on economic grounds cannot be taken for granted.
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Notes
1 Many thanks to James Curran, Frank Webster and an anonymous referee for their
comments. Thanks also to the Bank of England for permission to reproduce Figures
2 and 3 from the Bank’s quarterly bulletins.
2 For a range of social and political objections to increased marketization of media
see: Postman, 1985; Schiller, 1989; Herman and McChesney, 1997; McChesney et
al., 1998; Bagdikian, 2000; Golding and Murdock, 2000; Sparks, 2000; Davis, 2002;
Franklin, 2004; Miller, 2004.
3 For a range of such market-oriented arguments see: De Sola Pool, 1983; Murdoch,
1989; Dahlgren, 1995; Waters, 1995; Norris, 2000; Lull, 2001; Street, 2001; Lees-
Marshment, 2004.
4 These included: 36 directors of corporate public/investor relations (consultancies
and in-house), 22 fund managers, 12 officials in related government, associations
and regulatory bodies, 9 financial/business journalists and editors, and 16 others
who work in the City (including CEOs, stockbrokers and actuaries).
5 It should be noted that the criteria associated with ‘efficiency’ in markets generally
are not the same as those applied in financial market theory. A market may operate
efficiently according to EMH criteria but still be inefficient in other ways. See
Fama, 1970, for a description of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. For Fama (1970:
387), ideal market conditions are those where: ‘(i) there are no transactions costs in
trading securities, (ii) all available information is costlessly available to all market
participants, and (iii) all agree on the implications of current information for the
current price and distributions of future prices of each security’. See also Von
Hayek, 1945; Arrow, 1979, for similar descriptions of the role of information in
markets generally.
6 For most market theorists the idea that market prices are accurate or inaccurate is
not a question to be contemplated. Prices are simply set by supply and demand
and relative to measures set within the market. Many are thus sceptical at the
application of historical and accounting measures to judge the ‘accuracy’ of a
market.
7 The P/E or price–earnings ratio of a company or market is the total price of the
share(s) divided by the actual annual earnings of the company or market. The
higher the ratio the smaller the returns and the riskier the investment.
8 On these issues see, e.g.: Ingham, 1984; Strange, 1986, 1998; Hutton, 1996; Hirst
and Thompson, 1999; Myners, 2001; Golding, 2003; Davis, 2007.
9 See Smithers and Wright, 2000, 2004; Shiller, 2001; Cassidy, 2002; Swedberg, 2005.
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